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CASE NOTES 
A New Measure of Damages for Tippee-Trading 
Violations Under Rule lob-5: Elkind v. Liggett & 
Myers, Inc. 
Of all the issues arising under section 10(b) and rule lob-5 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: the subject of damages 
is the least formulated.' The extent of liability in private actions 
has been particularly unsettled in the case of "tippee" tradings 
on an impersonal market. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, established a private right of action for 
all uninformed outsiders who trade during a period of tippee 
trading but left the measure of damages open to speculation. Be- 
cause of the expansive size of this plaintiff class, concern arose 
over the potentially colossal liability under traditional measures 
of damages. In Elkind u. Liggett & Myers, Inc.' the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit confronted the 
issue and adopted a new measure of damages that places a ceil- 
ing on the otherwise potentially ruinous liability. Unlike the 
traditional "out-of-pocket" measure applied by the district 
court: the new "disgorgement" measure limits recovery to the 
amount the tippee gained from his wrongful trading? 
1. 15 U.S.C. $8 78a-78hh (1976). 
2. Jacobs, The Measure of Damages in Rule lob-5 Cases, 65 GEO. L.J. 1093, 1095 
(1977). 
3. Tipping has been defined as "the selective disclosure of material inside informa- 
tion." 5A A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE lob-5 8 162 (rev. ed. 1980). Damages are not 
recoverable for tipping alone. The gravamen of the violation is the tippee's trading on 
the basis of the tipped information while it is yet nonpublic. For this both the tipper and 
tippee are liable. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 165 (1980). Elkind ap- 
pears to be the first case to actually impose damages in a private action for tippee 
trading. 
4. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974). 
5. 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980). 
6. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
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I. INSTANT CASE 
1971 marked a record year for Liggett & Myers, 1nc.P with 
earnings of $4.22 per share. The first quarter of 1972 was equally 
promising with earnings of $1.00 per share (compared to $31 in 
the first quarter of 1971).@ Release of these figures caused opti- 
mism in the financial community over Liggett's prospects and 
led to reports predicting that 1972 earnings would increase by 
about ten percent over 1971 earnings. In contrast to outward ap- 
pearances and unknown to the public, second quarter earnings 
dropped sharply. In late June, the price of Liggett's common 
stock began to steadily decline. On July 17, 1972, the board of 
directors received preliminary data showing the first half earn- 
ings at only $1.46 per share, down from $1.82 the previous 
year.1° On the same day, one day before the earnings informa- 
tion was released to the public, a securities analyst questioned 
the company's chief financial officer about the recent decline in 
price of Liggett's common stock. When he asked whether there 
was "a good possibility" that earnings would be down, he re- 
ceived an aflirmative "grudging" response. The Liggett officer 
added that this information was confidential.ll The analyst then 
sent a wire to his firmla and spoke with a stockbroker from a 
different firml%ho promptly sold 1,800 shares of Liggett stock 
on behalf of his customers.14 
A class action was brought against Liggett & Myers, Inc. by 
Arnold B. Elkind on behalf of all purchasers of Liggett & Myers 
stock between the time of the wrongful tip and the subsequent 
8. Liggett is a diversified company whose common stock is listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange. Id. at 158-59. 
9. Id. at  159. 
10. Id. at 160. 
11. Id. at  161. 
12. Interestingly, although the wire stated that because of low second-quarter earn- 
ings the first-half earnings would likely be lower than the previous year's, it did not 
recommend selling Liggett shares and in fact expressed optimism that the year as a 
whole should still show "some improvement" over the previous year's earnings, though 
not as much as previously forecast. Id. at n.7. 
13. The opinion of the Second Circuit omits the fact that the stockbroker was from 
a different firm than that of the financial analyst. See 472 F. Supp. at 128. This distinc- 
tion is critical in order to understand the not new but important principle that the liabil- 
ity of a tipper of inside information extends beyond trading by the tippee to trading by 
tippees of the tippee (sometimes called "remote" or "indirect" tippees). 5A A. JACOBS, 
supra note 3, Q 167. 
14. The liability of Liggett & Myers is predicated upon the trading of the stockbro- 
ker. See note 3 supra. 
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public dis~losure.~~ The district court found, and the Second 
Circuit firmed, that the July 17 divulgence constituted a tip of 
material l6 inside information, made with scienter, in violation of 
rule lob-5.'' Both courts agreed that all purchasers of Liggett 
stock between the afternoon of July 17 and the close of the mar- 
ket on July 18 l8 were entitled to damages. The courts, however, 
differed on how damages were to be measured. 
The district court looked to the out-of-pocket measure of 
damages and awarded the plaintiffs the difference between what 
they had paid for their stock and the "actual value" re- 
ceived-that is, the price at which the stock would have theoret- 
ically sold had the tip been publicly disclosed prior to the time 
of purchase.le To determine the "actual value" the court looked 
to the post-disclosure market price:20 
[Tlhe price which plaintiffs would have paid for their stock in 
the period [between the tip and public disclosure of the tipped 
information] . . . can be inferred from the price which inves- 
tors did pay for Liggett stock after they had absorbed the news 
contained in the Liggett press release of July 
15. The plaintiff class was originally much larger. However, claims based on earlier 
alleged violations were dismissed by the district court and their dismissal affirmed by the 
circuit court. The district court determined that a tip of material inside information had 
occurred on July 10 and granted recovery to all plaintifh who purchased Liggett stock 
between July 11 and July 18,1972. The class was trimmed further by the Second Circuit, 
which reversed the finding of liability based on the alleged July 10 tip and found the 
only violation to be the July 17 divulgence. 
16. Even though the tip did not prompt the securities analyst to advise his own firm 
to sell Liggett stock on behalf of its customers, the tip was found to be material. The 
Second Circuit correctly considered the tip's materiality, not in light of the tippee's sub- 
jective judgment of its relevance, but rather in light of the objective standard of 
"whether the tipped information, if divulged to the public, would have been likely to 
affect the decision of potential buyers and sellers." 635 F.2d at 166. 
17. Id. at 168. 
18. Although a press release was issued at 2:15 p.m. on July 18, the court extended 
the period of liability to the end of the trading day, reasoning that public disclosure was 
not made until the information appeared in the Wall Street Journul early the next 
morning. Id. at 173. 
19. 472 F. Supp. at 130-35. 
20. Originally the court used a "value line" to determine the hypothetical decline in 
value that would have occurred had the tipped information been released at  the time of 
the tippee trading. Id. at 129-30. Later the court filed an "Opinion Amending Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law" in which it concluded that the value line was based on the 
premise that Liggett had first breached its duty in June 1972, an allegation later proved 
false. Without sufficient evidence to construct a value line for the shorter period of liabil- 
ity ultimately found, the court determined "actual value" by looking to the post-disclo- 
sure market price. Id. at  132-35. 
21. Id. at 132. 
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Finding that it took eight trading days for the market to fully 
absorb the information contained in the press release, the court 
awarded damages based on the price of $43, the lowest closing 
price for Liggett stock during the eight trading days following 
the press release of July 18." Thus, the plaintiffs were awarded 
the difference between the price they paid for Liggett stock and 
$43, the "actual value" found by the district court. Based on the 
volume of trading during the period of liability, this would have 
amounted to a judgment of approximately $190,000.2s 
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of 
liability for the July 17 tip but remanded the case for a redeter- 
mination of damages. In considering the question of damages, 
the court recognized three possible measures. First, the court ex- 
amined the traditional out-of-pocket measure used by the dis- 
trict court. For several reasons, the court felt this measure was 
inappropriate. To begin with, the out-of-pocket measure is 
aimed at compensating victims of fraud for losses directly attrib- 
utable to the defendant. On an impersonal market, no such 
fraud can be attributed to a tipper or tippee." In addition, the 
court reasoned, the measure often involves insurmountable proof 
problems in tippee-trading cases. Because the "actual value" of 
the stock traded during the period of liability is hypothetical, 
expert testimony aimed at establishing that value may be highly 
speculative." Use of the post-disclosure market price as alterna- 
tive evidence of "actual value" during the period of nondisclo- 
sure is likewise fallible. The validity of this approach depends on 
the parity of the tip and the public disclosure. When the two 
differ, the basis of the damage calculation disappears. For exam- 
ple, public disclosure of the July 17 tip that there was "a good 
possibility" that earnings would be down would not necessarily 
have caused as great alarm as did the next day's press release of 
the disappointing preliminary earnings figures? Perhaps the 
most compelling reason, in the court's view, for rejecting the 
22. Id. at 133. 
23. The actual award was $740,000, based on the longer period of liability beginning 
with the July 10 tip. Id. at 135-36. The $190,000 figure is a calculation made by the 
author based on the estimated volume of trading during the shorter period of liability 
found by the Second Circuit. See id. at 136 app. 
24. 635 F.2d at 170. 
25. Id. 
26. The court illustrates the parity problem by pointing out the difliculty of calcu- 
lating how the public would have reacted to news that the Titanic was near an iceberg 
from how it later reacted to news that the oceanliner had struck an iceberg and sunk. Id. 
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out-of-pocket measure is its potential for imposing "Draco- 
niadPP7 damages that are totally out of proportion to the wrong 
committed. Because the liability in tippee-trading cases often 
falls ultimately on the innocent shareholders of the defendant 
c~rporation,'~ the court expressed reluctance to impose full out- 
of-pocket damages in cases of moderate or light tippee trading 
not likely to have substantially affected the market price of the 
stock. 
Next, the Second Circuit examined the direct market-reper- 
cussion theory of damages. This measure would allow an inno- 
cent investor who bought Liggett & Myers shares at or after the 
time the tippee sold Liggett shares on the basis of inside infor- 
mation to recover any decline in value of his shares that is trace- 
able to the tippee's wrongful trading." In the court's view, the 
advantage of this measure-limitation of the plaintiffs recovery 
to the amount of damage actually caused by the defendantiis 
outweighed by the extremely difficult and sometimes impossible 
burden of proving the extent to which a market price movement 
is attributable to the tippee's c o n d u ~ t . ~  Furthermore, the mea- 
sure allows no recovery for the tippee's violation of his duty to 
either disclose material inside information or to abstain from 
trading." 
Finally, the court weighed the pros and cons of the disgorge- 
ment measure of damages. This measure was described as 
follows: 
A third alternative is (1) to allow any uninformed investor 
. . . to recover any post-purchase decline in market value of 
his shares up to a reasonable time after he learns of the tipped 
informationsP or after there is a public disclosure of it but (2) 
limit his recovery to the amount gained by the tippee. . . .as 
27. This esoteric adjective derives from the Athenian lawgiver Draco, whose code of 
laws was exceedingly severe. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 443 (5th ed. 1979). 
28. The claims against all individual defendants, such as the corporate officer re- 
sponsible for the illegal tip, were dropped; the only party defendant brought to trial was 
the corporation. 472 F. Supp. at 124. 
29. 635 F.2d at 171. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. For reasons stated in notes 62 through 64 and the accompanying text infra, the 
author questions the propriety of denying the uninformed investor recovery for the de- 
cline in value of his shares after he learns of the tipped information but before the infor- 
mation is made public. 
33. 635 F.2d at 172 (footnote added). 
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To illustrate, the court posed a hypothetical situation in which a 
tippee sells 5,000 shares of stock in X Corporation at $50 per 
share on the basis of inside information; before public disclosure 
an uninformed investor buys securities in X Corporation at $45 
per share; and within a reasonable time after public disclosure 
the stock declines to $40 per share. Under the disgorgement 
measure, the uninformed purchaser would recover the difference 
between his purchase price ($45) and the market price within a 
reasonable time after public disclosure ($40), subject to a limit 
of $50,000, the amount the tippee gained by trading on inside 
information rather than on an equal information basis. If the 
aggregate claims of the intervening buyers exceed the tippee's 
gain, "their recovery (limited to that gain) would be shared pro 
rata."s4 
In assessing the disgorgement measure, the court pointed 
out several advantages. Most importantly, the measure avoids 
the imposition of excessive, "Draconian" damages and, in most 
cases, results in damages awards roughly commensurate to the 
actual harm caused by tippee trading. Because the calculations 
required are simple and precise, the disgorgement measure 
avoids the troublesome proof problems involved in other mea- 
sures. In addition, the court felt the measure would deter tip- 
ping of inside information and tippee trading? 
The court also considered the disadvantages of the measure. 
For one, it modifies the principle that, ordinarily, liability for a 
rule lob-5 violation should not depend upon gain to the wrong- 
doer. The measure also partially duplicates disgorgement reme- 
dies available to the SEC. In addition, the court recognized that 
in certain situations the measure might seem to favor the wrong- 
doer, as where the total claims exceed the tippee's gain and pro 
rata recovery is mandated, or where, because of the modest 
amount of tippee trading, a class action may not be worthwhile. 
In contrast, the tipper and tippee may be vulnerable to heavy 
damages when the market price is depressed by causes unrelated 
to the tippee's trading. Despite these disadvantages, "as between 
the various alternatives [the court was] persuaded, after weigh- 
ing the pros and cons, that the disgorgement measure . . . offers 
the most equitable resolution of the difficult problems created 
34. Id. 
35. Id.. 
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by conflicting interests."" 
11. ANALYSIS 
A. Policy Considerations 
The Second Circuit's decision is consistent with the reme- 
dial purpose of rule lob-5 and is sound in terms of law and pol- 
icy. The process by which the court adopted the new damages 
measure-weighing the pros and cons of the various alternatives 
in light of policy concerns-is consistent with Supreme Court 
guidelines. Commenting on the lack of legislative direction in 
the development of rule lob-5, the Court has noted that "[ilt is 
therefore proper that we consider, in addition to [other] factors 
. . . , what may be described as policy considerations when we 
come to flesh out the portions of the law with respect to which 
neither the congressional enactment nor the administrative reg- 
ulations offer conclusive g~idance."'~ Because the body of law on 
private actions under rule lob-5 is largely "a judicial oak which 
has grown from little more than a legislative acorn,"" the Su- 
preme Court has given federal courts a broad mandate, in the 
context of implied civil causes of action, to fashion whatever 
remedies may be appropriate to effect the general remedial pur- 
pose intended by Congres~.~@ Given this broad mandate, analysis 
of any damages measure for tippee trading violations necessarily 
centers on the policies that underlie rule lob-5. 
Rule lob-5 "is based in policy on the justifiable expectation 
of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on imper- 
sonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material informa- 
tion."'O To achieve equality of information in the market, dam- 
ages measures have traditionally focused on deterring conduct 
inconsistent with that aim and compensating victims of viola- 
tions." As the scope of rule lob-5 has expanded from face-to- 
face transactions to impersonal market transactions, some com- 
mentators have suggested that in the open or public market con- 
text a broad deterrent policy should predominate over the com- 
36. Id. at 173. 
37. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
38. Id. 
39. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); J. I. Case 
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964). 
40. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). 
41. 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW $ 9.22[1] (rev. 
ed. 1979). 
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pensatory policy relevant in the private market.'2 Another 
recent concern of courts and commentators has been to avoid 
awarding colossal damages to indeterminate classes of plaintiffs 
to be paid in the last instance by innocent  shareholder^.^^ The 
problem with arriving at a measure of damages consistent with 
the above policy considerations is that not all of the policy con- 
siderations are harmonious. For example, the deterrent element 
of a damages measure must sometimes be compromised in order 
to avoid the imposition of excessive damages. The most appro- 
priate damages formula, then, will be the one that best balances 
the varying policy considerations-in other words, the one which 
provides an adequate amount of deterrence and justly compen- 
sates victims but which avoids the imposition of exorbitant dam- 
ages ultimately payable by innocent shareholders. 
B. Damages Measures Rejected by the Elkind Court 
1. The out-of-pocket measure 
The Second Circuit wisely rejected the out-of-pocket mea- 
sure. The out-of-pocket measure awards to all members of the 
plaintiff class the difference between the amount they paid for 
their stock and the "actual value" received, i.e., the price at  
which the stock would have sold had there been public disclo- 
sure of the tipped information. Although this measure fully com- 
pensates the victims and more than adequately deters violators, 
it often does so at the expense of innocent shareholders and can 
lead to astronomical awards out of all proportion to the wrong 
42. Note, Rule lob-5 Damages: The Runaway Development of a Common Law 
Remedy, 28 U .  h a .  L. REV. 76, 100-101 (1975). One commentator maintains that deter- 
rence should be the only goal of remedies for open market violations and that compensa- 
tory remedies are inappropriate. Thus, he suggests that private actions be abolished be- 
cause SEC investigations and criminal sanctions provide adequate deterrence. Note, 
Limiting the Plaintiff Class: Rule lob-5 and the Federal Securities Code, 72 ~ C H .  L. 
REV. 1398, 1429-30 (1974). But see Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 314 (6th Cir. 
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977) (primary purpose of the private cause of action 
is to compensate plaintiffs for damages caused by defendants' illegal acts). 
43. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 866-67 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, 
J., concurring); 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 41, 5 9.22[1]. See also Blue Chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,739 (1975). Elkind is an illustration of the 
corporation being held liable as a tipper of inside information on an agency theory, the 
tip of the corporate officer is imputed to the corporation. Because the liability of tipper 
and tippee for the tippee's wrongful trading is the same, the corporation's deep pocket 
makes it the most logical defendant from the plaintiff's standpoint. A damages award 
paid by the corporation is indirectly borne by the shareholders. 
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committed. In some cases the victims may be overcompensated, 
as where the market price of their shares is depressed by factors 
totally unrelated to the tippee trading or to the public disclosure 
of the tipped information. Where the post-disclosure market 
price is used to determine "actual value" during the period of 
nondisclosure, the wrongdoers become virtual insurers for losses 
sustained by anyone who happens to trade in the same stock 
until public disclosure is made.44 
In addition to these policy reasons against the out-of-pocket 
measure, there are legal grounds against its application to im- 
personal market violations. Because the out-of-pocket measure 
may potentially provide for damages in excess of those caused in 
fact by the defendant," it may contravene the mandate of sec- 
tion 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that "no per- 
son permitted to maintain a suit for damages . . . shall recover 
. . . a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account 
of the act complained of."46 The weak causal link between tip- 
pee trading on an impersonal market and the harm to interven- 
ing traders justifies a damages measure less stringent than the 
out-of-pocket measure. In light of the courts' tendency to relax 
the common law elements of fraud initially thought to be a pre- 
requisite to liability for a rule lob-5 violation, recovery need not 
depend on a strict finding of causation. This does not mean, 
however, that the question of causation should be ignored and 
full recovery allowed when the plaintiffs harm cannot logically 
be attributed to the defendant's wrongful act. 
2. The direct market-repercussion theory 
The direct market-repercussion theory of damages is a futile 
answer to the difficult question of causation. In theory, this mea- 
sure avoids unwarranted damages awards by allowing recovery 
only for injuries caused by the tippee trading. However, the di- 
rect market-repercussion measure is practical only in cases of 
heavy tippee trading, where an actual market impact can be 
proven. In cases of light or moderate tippee trading, where the 
44. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 
(1977), illustrates this problem. The profit of one of the defendants, which had already 
been disgorged in an SEC proceeding, amounted to only $13,000. A finding of liability in 
a private class action under the out-of-pocket measure might have produced a damages 
award in excess of $7 million. Id. at 321 n.29. 
45. See notes 52 through 59 and accompanying text infra. 
46. 15 U.S.C. $ 78bb(a) (1976). 
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impact on the market is likely to be negligible, the wrongdoers 
are protected by the difficult standard of proof. Thus, modest 
tippee trading would flourish. The expense of proving the extent 
to which a market price decline is traceable to the defendant's 
conduct would likely involve expert witness fees and higher at- 
torneys fees than those in the other, more mechanical measures 
of damages. These increased costs would discourage private liti- 
gation where the possible award is not high enough to make a 
suit worthwhile. The direct market-repercussion theory fails to 
serve two important policy aims of rule lob-5: it inadequately 
deters rule violations and undercompensates victims of such 
violations. 
3. Other measures 
Other measures of damages not considered by the Second 
Circuit47 are generally subject to the same criticisms as the out- 
of-pocket measure, especially in their potential for imposing 
"Draconian" liability. Motivated by a distaste for excessive dam- 
ages, courts and commentators have suggested other methods to 
limit liability for open market violations. These include: increas- 
ing the stringency of the standard of proof as the size of the 
plaintiff class and resulting potential damages increase;48 legisla- 
tively abolishing private actions for open market violations and 
granting exclusive enforcement authority to the SEC, with dam- 
ages awards financing enforcement endeavors;'. and recognizing 
existing SEC disgorgement remedies as the exclusive mode of 
redress.so 
C. Causation and Damages Measures 
Other approaches center on limiting the scope of compensa- 
ble harm. For example, one commentator advocates reintroduc- 
ing the requirement of establishing proximate cause and reliance 
in class actions, which would cause questions affecting individual 
47. For a general discussion of the various measures possible for a rule lob-5 viola- 
tion, see Jacobs, note 2 supra; Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule lob-5 Cases 
Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371 (1974). 
48. Mullaney, Theories of Measuring Damages in Security Cases and the Effects of 
Damages on Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 277, 292 (1977). 
49. Note, Damages to Uninformed Traders for Insider Trading on Impersonal 
Exchanges, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 299, 317-18 (1974). 
50. See Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 321-22 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 1053 (1977). 
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members to predominate over questions common to the class, 
thus defeating the class action under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Pro~edure .~~ The Sixth Circuit's reliance on causation in 
Fridrich u. BradfordB2 has reduced the plaintiff class to an ex- 
tent which makes a class action nearly impossible. In Fridrich 
the court held that the defendants' act of trading on the basis of 
inside information was not "causally connected" with any loss 
by the plaintiffs, who traded on an impersonal market and 
whose decision to buy or sell was unaffected by the wrongful act 
of defendants. This view of causation is at odds with the Second 
Circuit's view in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch." The Sixth Circuit 
disagreed with the Second Circuit's interpretation of the "causa- 
tion in fact" language of Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United 
StatesYM which reads as follows: 
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a 
failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequi- 
site to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld 
be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have 
considered them important in the making of this decision. . . . 
This obligation to disclose and this withholding of a material 
fact establish the requisite element of causation in fact.55 
The Second Circuit in Shapiro expanded the application of this 
language from the face-to-face transaction in Affiliated Ute Citi- 
zens to open-market nondisclosure violations as well. The Sixth 
Circuit, however, read the language narrowly and limited its ap- 
plication to the circumstances of Affiliated Ute Citizens, where 
the plaintiffs' harm came as a result of a deliberate scheme by 
the defendants to induce the plaintiffs to sell their stock while 
the defendants withheld material facts that would have influ- 
enced the plaintiffs' decision to sell. 
Elkind follows Shapiro and takes an even more relaxed 
view of causation. Indeed, the Elkind court did not even sepa- 
rately consider whether there was causation but indicated that 
materiality and scienter are the only essential elements of liabil- 
ity for tippee trading. It is safe to say that the Second Circuit 
views causation as existing whenever the tip is material (reason- 
51. Note, Rule lob-5 Damages: The Runaway Development of a Common Law 
Remedy, 28 U .  FLA. L. REV. 76, 100 (1975). 
52. 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 US. 1053 (1977). 
53. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974). 
54. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). 
55. Id. at 153-54 (citations omitted). 
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ably likely to affect the decision of potential buyers and sellers). 
The difference of position between the two circuits results 
from their different postures toward the role of causation. The 
causation found to exist in Shapiro is actually nothing more 
than causation of the fact of injury to the plaintiffs. Fridrich, on 
the other hand, is concerned with the extent of the plaintiffs' 
injury actually caused by the defendant's act. As the Sixth Cir- 
cuit correctly points out, the duty of an insider or tippee to dis- 
close is not an absolute one, but an alternative one to either 
"disclose or ab~ ta in . "~  It is the act of trading, not the failure to 
disclose, that violates rule lob-5. Because the defendant's trad- 
ing on an impersonal market does not alter the plaintiffs expec- 
tations or in any way influence the plaintiffs trading decision, 
the defendant's trading cannot be said to be the cause in fact of 
the plaintiffs injury; the plaintiffs injury (decline in value of his 
shares) would have been the same had the defendant abstained 
from trading and publicly released the inside information at a 
later date. It cannot accurately be said that, but for the defen- 
dant's act, the plaintiff would not have suffered a decline in the 
value of his shares. The Sixth Circuit, in Fridrich, correctly de- 
termines that insider trading is not necessarily the cause of the 
decline in value of the plaintiffs shares and ends its inquiry with 
a finding of no causation 
What Fridrich fails to recognize-and what Shapiro and 
Elkind only implicitly recognize-is that the plaintiff has been 
harmed in the sense that his statutory right to trade on an equal 
information basiss7 has been violated and that the defendant's 
illegal trading on the basis of inside information is the cause of 
the plaintiffs harm in this sense. Granted, the harm suffered by 
the violation of this intangible right does not necessarily equal 
the decline in value of the plaintiffs shares. For this reason, the 
out-of-pocket measure of damages bears no logical relation to 
56. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,848 (2d Cir. 1968); 5A A. JACOBS, 
supra note 3, 5 165.01; 5 id. 5 66.02[c]. 
57. The implied private right of action to recover for a rule lob-5 violation is 
grounded in tort. The seminal decision is this area was Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 
69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The rationale for judicially implying a private civil 
remedy was found in the RESTA~MENT OF TORTS 5 286 (1934), which recognized the 
disregard of the command of a statute as a wrongful act and a tort. Kardon also cited 
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 US. 33, 39 (1916), which recognized the right to recover 
damages where the violation of a statute results in damage to one for whose protection 
the statute was enacted. 
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tippee trading violations in an impersonal market.s8 But the de- 
fendant has violated the rule, and the plaintiff has been harmed 
by the defendant's conduct (though not necessarily to the full 
extent of his monetary loss). For this reason, the Fridrich court's 
denial of recovery is incorrect. In keeping with the federal 
courts' broad powers to fashion remedies to effect the remedial 
purpose of rule lob-5," some remedy ought to be provided. Be- 
cause the extent to which the plaintiffs loss was actually caused 
by the defendant is usually impossible to ascertain, the remedy 
should be so fashioned that the policy objectives of deterrence 
and disclosure predominate over the compensatory concerns rel- 
evant in face-to-face transactions. 
D. The Damages Measure Adopted by the Elkind Court: 
The Disgorgement Measure 
Damages awards under the disgorgement measure are equal 
to the aggregate of plaintiff losses limited by the tippee's gain. 
The mechanics of this measure entail a two-part calculation. 
The first part is to determine the loss of each member of the 
plaintiff class.60 In the case of an injured buyer this amount con- 
sists of the difference between the purchase price and the de- 
pressed market value of the buyer's shares within a reasonable 
time after public disclosure." The court in the instant case indi- 
cated in dictum that it would limit recovery to interim traders 
who learn of the tipped information before public disclosure: 
"[The plaintiff is entitled] to recover any post-purchase decline 
58. Perhaps the Elkind court was recognizing this fact when it criticized the out-of- 
pocket measure as inappropriate in open market violations because "it is directed toward 
compensating a person for losses directly traceable to the defendant's fraud upon him. 
No such fraud or inducement may be attributed to a tipper or tippee trading on an 
impersonal market." 635 F.2d at 170 (emphasis added). 
59. See note 39 supra. 
60. The word "loss" is intentionally used to avoid the connotation of causation asso- 
ciated with the word "damages." 
61. An injured seller (where the tippee buys on inside information) would recover 
the difference between the price at which he sold and the higher fair market value of his 
shares within a reasonable time after public disclosure. ALI FED. SEC. CODE $9 1708(b), 
1708(a)(2)(B) (Proposed Official Draft 1978). Note: Although the 1980 bound volume of 
the ALI Federal Securities Code is now in circulation, this Case Note cites to the 1978 
Proposed Official Draft referred to by the Elkind court. The content of all sections cited 
is the same in the two editions except for a few minor changes in wording. The 1980 
Code represents the final product of the American Law Institute. For a detailed discus- 
sion of the proposed Federal Securities Code, see 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1425-648 (1979) 
(symposium issue). 
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in market value of his shares up to a reasonable time after he 
learns of the tipped information or after there is public dis- 
closure of it."62 Denying recovery for the market price decline 
occuring after an interim investor learns of the tipped informa- 
tion but before public disclosure encourages the investor to im- 
mediately sell-in violation of rule lob-5fS A better rule would 
be to eliminate the "after he learns of the tipped information" 
language and allow all uninformed purchasers to recover the 
post-purchase decline in value up to a reasonable time after 
public disclosure, including those who learn of the tipped infor- 
mation prior to public disclosure-provided they do not trade 
until after public disclosure." 
The second part of the disgorgement measure calculation is 
to determine the amount of the tippee's gain, which acts as an 
upper limit of liability. This amount consists of the difference 
between the price obtained by selling on the basis of inside in- 
formation and the market price of the same number of shares 
after public disclosure of the tipped inforrnati~n.~~ 
What the disgorgement measure amounts to is a potentially 
full "rescissory measure"66 of damages for each individual plain- 
62. 635 F.2d at 172 (emphasis added). 
63. An injured buyer who learns of the tipped information before it is publicly dis- 
seminated becomes a tippee and hence takes on the duty to "disclose or refrain." SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,848 (2d Cir. 1968). Because he most likely will not 
have the authority to make a public disclosure of the information, and because disclosure 
to an individual seller is impossible on an impersonal market exchange, the buyer is 
placed in the precarious position of having to choose between two undesirable alterna- 
tives: (1) He can refrain from trading and suffer the additional decline in value of his 
shares until public disclosure is made, with no hope of recovering this "post individual 
awareness" decline, or (2) he can immediately trade his securities-in violation of rule 
lob-5--to mitigate his loss. The latter option involves the risk of incurring individual 
liability for his securities law violation. In addition, it potentially eliminates, as a practi- 
cal matter, his right of recovery for the decline in value of his shares up to the time he 
learned of the tipped information; fear of his own violation being discovered may prevent 
him from stepping forward to claim recovery for his injury. Trading to avoid the unre- 
coverable decline also increases the potential liability of the original tipper, who is liable 
for the trading of both his direct tippee and indirect tippees. See note 13 supra. 
64. This is the position taken in ALI FED. SEC. CODE 5s 1703(b), 1708(b) (Proposed 
Official Draft 1978). The Second Circuit may have relied on 5 1703(h)(l), which specifies 
the end of "the reasonable period" (for purposes of determining the decline in value of 
the injured buyer's stock) as "a reasonable period after (A) the time when all material 
facts (or facts of special significance as the case may be) become generally available, or 
(B), with respect to  . . . a plaintiff who . . . the defendant proves knew those facts at an 
earlier time, that time. . . ." If this is the case, the court overlooked the fact that 5 
1708(b) explicitly states that 1703(h)(l)(B) does not apply to the damages measure. 
65. 635 F.2d at 172. 
66. Awarding the injured buyer the difference between the price he paid for his 
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tiff, with the aggregate liability of the defendant limited to the 
amount of the tippee's gain. This quasi-equitable remedy7 
should be accepted as an appropriate measure of liability if it is 
consistent with the policy objectives of rule lob-5. 
The effectiveness of a damages formula's contribution to the 
overall objective of equality of information in market trading de- 
pends largely on its deterrent effect. The court in Elkind consid- 
ered the deterrent effect of the disgorgement measure in one 
sentence: "To the extent that it makes the tipper and tippees 
liable up to the amount gained by their misconduct, it should 
deter tipping of inside information and tippee-trading.'- Al- 
though this important policy objective deserved more considera- 
tion by the court, the seemingly hasty conclusion is sound. The 
potential liability of a tipper of inside information-the amount 
gained not only by his direct tippee but also by all remote tip- 
pees6@-will usually far outweigh any benefit to be derived from 
the wrongful tip.l0 The sufficiency of the deterrent effect on tip- 
pees is a closer question. Admittedly, the tippee stands to lose 
only what he has gained from his illegal trading. However, the 
deterrent effect on tippees is not nearly as important as that on 
the tipper, who is the fountainhead of the stream of inside infor- 
mation. Usually tippees will not even be made parties to the 
suit, making the measure of damages applicable to them irrele- 
stock and the decreased market price after public disclosure would allow him to sell the 
stock for the lower market price and, with his damages award, be restored to his prior 
position. For the injured buyer who desires to retain his stock, the award in effect 
"reduces" the original purchase price to what the market price would have been had the 
undisclosed inside information been made public prior to the purchase. The rescisaory 
measure of damages has sometimes been used in cases of active misrepresentation and 
induced fraud. For a discussion on the rescissory measure, see Note, The Measure of 
Damages in Rule lob-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 
371, 371-77 (1974). It is interesting to note that the rescissory measure involves the same 
calculations and produces the same result as the out-of-pocket measure when the post- 
disclosure purchase price is used as nunc pro tunc evidence of "actual value" at the time 
of sale. 
67. Because of the lack of a definite causal link between the wrongful act and the 
measure of liability, the disgorgement measure might more accurately be thought of as a 
quasi-equitable remedy rather than as a measure of damages. The object of the measure 
is to afford the monetary equivalent of rescission up to the amount of the wrongdoer's 
gain. 
68. 635 F.2d at 172. 
69. See note 13 supra. 
70. In most cases, the tipper derives an intangible benefit only, such as the goodwill 
of the tippee. The only benefit Liggett & Myers was found to have obtained from its 
wrongful tip was the maintenance of "a good relationship" with the analyst tippee. 472 
F. Supp. at 134. 
422 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I981 
vant. Moreover, the arguably weak deterrent effect of the dis- 
gorgement measure on both tippers and tippees could be height- 
ened by prejudgment interest at a rate sufficient to make the 
eventual liability exceed the benefit attained? In addition, the 
deterrent effect of the disgorgement measure is augmented by 
the prospects of duplicate disgorgement remedies available to 
the SEC and the possibility of criminal liability." 
Perhaps the major disadvantage of the disgorgement mea- 
sure is that the ceiling of the tippee's gain reduces the measure's 
deterrent effect on light tippee trading. Since the origination of 
a private suit depends upon the likelihood of a recovery substan- 
tial enough to make the costs of litigation an acceptable risk, 
minor tipping violations will likely pass unchecked by private 
litigants. Although such violations are subject to SEC proceed- 
ings and criminal sanctions, the limited policing capabilities of 
the SEC make the unlikelihood of deterrence from private suits 
a valid concern. The Supreme Court has indicated the impor- 
tance of private litigation as "a necessary supplement to Com- 
mission action" in enforcing the securities laws?' However, the 
converse-holding tipper and tippee liable for full out-of-pocket 
losses of interim investors regardless of the amount of shares 
traded by the tippee-seems even less desirable. 
Another apparent disadvantage to the disgorgement mea- 
sure is that it does not fully compensate plaintiffs when their 
aggregate claim exceeds the tippee's gain. However, because of 
the tenuous causal link between the wrong and the injury, full 
compensation may be inappropriate. Instead of granting full re- 
covery, the disgorgement measure attempts to grant recovery 
"roughly commensurate to the actual harm caused by the tip- 
pee's wrongful conduct?' 
In a case where the tippee sold only a few shares, for 'instance, 
the likelihood of his conduct causing any substantial injury to 
71. Prejudgment interest has generally but not invariably been allowed on damages 
for rule lob-5 violations. 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 41, § 9.22[4]. 
72. The SEC has express power to conduct investigations of past or potential viola- 
tions of the federal securities laws. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(a)-78u(c) (1976). The Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 provides for fines and imprisonment of up to five years for willful 
violations of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1976). The Second Circuit has indicated by way of 
dictum that SEC proceedings and private actions for damages are not mutually exclusive 
remedies. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 241 11.18 
(2d Cir. 1974). 
73. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). 
74. 635 F.2d at 172. 
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intervening investors buying without benefit of his confidential 
information would be small. If, on the other hand, the tippee 
sold large amounts of stock, realizing substantial profits, the 
likelihood of injury to intervening uninformed purchasers 
would be greater and the amount of potential recovery thereby 
proportionately enlarged.76 
The court admits that "[ulnder some market conditions such as 
where the market price is depressed by wholly unrelated causes, 
the tippee might be vulnerable to heavy damages, permitting 
some plaintiffs to recover undeserved ~indfa l l s . "~~ But even in 
this situation, liability is limited to the tippee's gain. Further- 
more, since the measure is premised on the idea that the actual 
cause of depressed market prices is difficult and sometimes im- 
possible to ascertain, the measure takes into account the "likeli- 
hood" of the harm being caused by the tippee trading by corre- 
lating the potential liability to the volume of tippee trading. In 
this manner the measure approximates the actual harm caused 
and avoids "windfall recoveries of exorbitant amounts bearing 
no relation to the seriousness of the miscondu~t. '~~ 
Because of the conflicting interests involved in the various 
policy considerations that must be considered in choosing a 
damages formula, it is impractical to search for the perfect 
formula. Instead, courts should do as the Elkind court did and 
choose the formula that on balance best achieves the policy aims 
of deterring violators and compensating victims but avoiding the 
imposition of exorbitant damages bearing no relation to the 
wrong committed. Of all the measures suggested in the legal 
literature on this subject, the disgorgement measure strikes the 
best balance among these policy aims. 
E. The Scope of the Elkind Decision 
Even if one accepts the proposition that Elkind u. Liggett & 
Myers, Inc. is sound when limited to its facts, the broad ques- 
tion remains of defining the reach of the court's decision. For 
example, should the disgorgement measure apply to a corporate 
insider who trades on his own account while withholding mate- 
rial inside information? Although the court did not expressly in- 
dicate that the new measure was to apply to cases of insider 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 172-73. 
77. Id. at 172. 
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trading, such an intention may be inferred. The ALI Federal Se- 
curities Code, relied on by the court, imposes the disgorgement 
measure on corporate insiders who trade on their own account.78 
The consensus of opinion favors the same measure of damages 
for corporate insiders as for tippers and tippees.le 
Basically, the same policy considerations involved in tippee- 
trading cases apply to insider-trading cases. Perhaps the only 
difference lies in the level of deterrence desired. It might be ar- 
gued that under the disgorgement measure a tipper of inside in- 
formation stands to lose much more than he gains by tipping 
and that the disgorgement measure thus adequately deters the 
evils of tipping at the source. In contrast, a corporate insider 
who trades on his own account stands to lose only what he has 
gained by his wrongful act and thus is not adequately deterred. 
However, the need to deter insider trading is not as great as the 
need to deter tipping of inside information. "Tipping because it 
involves a more widespread imbalance of information presents 
an even greater threat to the integrity of the marketplace than 
simple insider trading."80 Moreover, the deterrent effect of the 
disgorgement measure is augmented by other factors: In addi- 
tion to SEC proceedings, criminal liability, and the prejudge- 
ment interest mentioned above, an insider may be liable for 
short-swing profits under section 16(b) and may suffer unfavora- 
ble tax  consequence^.^ The possible availability of state law 
remedies serves as an additional deterrent to insider trading." 
Another question remaining after Elkind is the rigidity with 
which the disgorgement measure should apply to impersonal 
market  violation^.^^ Should it be applied exclusively, in all cases, 
78. ALI FED. SEC. CODE $5 1603, 1703(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1978). 
79. E.g., Jacobs, supra note 2, at 1130 n.211. 
80. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 327 n.12 (6th Cir. 1976) (Celebrezze, J., con- 
curring), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); cf. Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 
325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (tipper is more a t  fault than .tippee who trades on the 
tipped information). Although the prevalence of tipping is unknown, some estimate that 
it is rather widespread. 2 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODI- 
TIES FRAUD 8 7.5(1) (1979). 
81. The gain experienced by the insider on his wrongful trading presumably will 
have been taken in a prior year as a capital gain. Based on analogy to the tax conse- 
quences in a section 16(b) situation, the liability may have to be reported as a capital 
loss. Unless the insider has "capital gains in the current or carried-forward year against 
which to offset such capital [loss], the loss may be of limited value to [him]. I.R.C. 8 
1211(b)." 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 41, 8 9.22[5] n.475. 
82. See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 
(1969). 
83. The term "impersonal market violation" embraces trading on inside information 
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or should the ceiling of the tippee's gain be removed in certain 
instances to allow full rescissory or out-of-pocket damages? For 
example, where the difficult burden of proof is overcome and the 
damages actually caused by the defendant's violation are proved 
to be more or less than the amount provided by the disgorge- 
ment measure, should the court abandon the disgorgement mea- 
sure and award actual  damage^?^ Should egregious violations 
such as the selling of nonpublic inside information justify a more 
stringent measure of damages? The court seemed to embrace 
the disgorgement measure unreservedly and to reject the out-of- 
pocket measure and the direct market-repercussion theory gen- 
erally. However, these questions may need to be answered on a 
case-by-case basis by reexamining the policy objectives of rule 
lob-5 and balancing two competing interests: (1) the conve- 
nience of the precise, workable formula of the disgorgement 
measure, and (2) the desirability of fixing liability so that it is 
commensurate with the wrong done and the damage actually 
caused thereby. In most cases, the disgorgement measure will 
satisfy both interests. In order to achieve some level of certainty 
and uniformity in a very unsettled area of the law, courts should 
adopt the disgorgement measure as the general rule in private 
actions for impersonal market violations and deviate therefrom 
only in rare instances. 
In Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc. the Second Circuit was 
faced with the difficult task of choosing a damages formula for 
tippee-trading violations under rule lob-5. This Case Note has 
attempted to establish that the formula adopted, the disgorge- 
ment measure, is the best alternative because it strikes the best 
balance among the relevant policy considerations and seems 
most compatible with the theory of causation in impersonal 
market transactions. It is not suggested that the disgorgement 
both by insiders on their own accounts and by tippees. 
84. The ALI Federal Securities Code allows the disgorgement measure to be "re- 
duced to the extent . . . that the defendant proves that the violation did not cause the 
loss.'' ALI FED. SEC. CODE 5 1708(b)(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1978). In the situation of 
an injured buyer who sells his stock before public disclosure of the tipped information, 
this section may limit recovery to the amount of decline in value up to the time of sale 
(or a pro rata portion thereof where the total claims exceed the tippee's gain). The ALI 
Code also allows the awarding of consequential damages and costs without regard to the 
limit of the tippee's gain. ALI FED. SEC. CODE 88 1708(b)(3), 1723(a), 1723(d) (Proposed 
Official Draft 1978). 
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measure is perfect. In the future, courts that confront situations 
similar to that presented before the Elkind court may wish to 
explore variations of or alternatives to the disgorgement mea- 
sure. For example, if it is felt that the disgorgement measure 
does not adequately deter tippers of inside information, courts 
might impose exemplary damages on top of the regular damages 
recoverable under the disgorgement measure. Or, courts may 
wish to exercise their broad remedial powers by maintaining a 
flexible approach and applying a more stringent measure of 
damages for particularly serious violations. The legislatures, 
state and national, may wish to explore other avenues such as 
the establishment of a double- or treble-disgorgement formula. 
Until these and other avenues and variations have been further 
explored, the Elkind decision remains as persuasive authority in 
favor of the disgorgement measure of damages. 
Mark W. Hansen 
